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
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AN ALLY OR A HINDRANCE?

THE severance on February 3 of diplomatic relations with Germany was an act that had two immediate consequences: First, it restored to Americans a country of which they could all be proud. Secondly, it rehabilitated the somewhat tattered prestige of the United States abroad. Not all Americans realize how vitally essential both these developments had become. So long as we remained a disunited people, with an uneasy conscience and a bitter sense that in this, the most moving tragedy in the world's history, we had played but a paltry part, our potential strength for justice and righteousness was as good as wasted and we could neither speak nor act as a nation. So long, too, as Europe, and especially the French and British democracies, looked upon us as negligible shirkers of a plain duty, Mr. Wilson's pleas for a world-league of peace were mere thrusts in the air. There was no clearer or more delicate task before us than that of regaining our own self-respect and the respect of the world. That task was accomplished when, in response to the most insolent challenge ever flung in the face of a great Power, the President broke off all official connections with the Wilhelmstrasse. America became instantly one and the outer world was surprised into the recognition that at a pinch we could act with dignity and decision.

Possibly even Mr. Wilson himself does not quite realize how greatly by that one firm stroke he has advanced the cause of universal peace and added to the beneficent potentialities of the United States in the future ordering of the

world's affairs. It is the stern condition of the stern times in which we live that international influence is impossible without either power or respect and a readiness to use the one and cultivate the other. We have the power, but it is latent and for all immediate purposes inoperative, and our instincts and traditions are against its employment outside the American hemisphere. But up to February 3 we had not the respect of either set of the belligerents. Our policy had forfeited it. Our moral standing, once our most potent and persuasive asset, had been lowered. The great force of American idealism had been allowed to rust. For lack of clear leadership we had fallen hideously, disastrously, in the scale of opinion. And it was plain that as a neutral we could never recover the ground we had lost. Had this war continued to the end, with the United States a wealthy and inactive onlooker, entrenched in a cold isolation and emitting from time to time well-meant but profoundly irritating suggestions for the improvement of the universe, the nations that had fought and bled and suffered for all that they hold most dear would simply have passed us by in the silence of scorn. To make ourselves felt in the future of the world we had first of all to enter it. To influence in any way the conditions of peace we had first of all to get into the war. Mr. Wilson might have thumped the cushions of his Presidential pulpit till the world was deafened and it would have been to no effect. Words without deeds, protestations without the force to make them good, aspirations without acts, policies without power—these are the instruments of the Age of Gold and not of the harsh, mad, jostling but invigorating world in which our lot is actually cast.

But now, thank Heaven, we have ceased to be neutral. We have now at long last taken sides, and the side we have taken is the side of democracy, of public faith, of all that makes for right-dealing between nations. It is the side to which from the first the sentiments of the vast majority of the American people have overwhelmingly inclined. Formally, deliberately, after the most patient efforts to avoid a rupture, we have been compelled to break with the Power that has brought this measureless cataclysm upon the world. And in doing so we have taken the one step that was indispensable if the President's dream of world-peace was ever to be realized and if the influence of the United States was to count at all in the final settlement. But a severance of relations, while

the strongest measure known to diplomacy, is also and essentially a negative act. If we stop with that, if we confine ourselves to the mere pronouncement of a moral condemnation, the effect of the stand we have taken will pass away and we shall have gained little for ourselves and have contributed even less to the cause of the Allies which henceforth is our cause. Having gone that far we must be prepared, when the call comes, to go still further. The President rightly for the time being restricted his reply to the German proclamation of a war of murder on the high seas to handing Count Bernstorff his passports and recalling Mr. Gerard from Berlin. But at the same time he intimated that if the Germans carried out their threat and American ships or American lives were thereby lost, he would come before Congress and ask for a declaration of war. That our relations with Germany can remain in a state of indefinite suspension is scarcely credible. Given an indiscriminate submarine campaign, such as the Germans foreshadow and such as the necessities of their position force upon them, sooner or later American citizens and American property will be destroyed and the United States and Germany will be at war. Even before this appears in print the inevitable may have happened and war may have been declared.

It is proper therefore that we should consider in what directions our resources can most profitably be employed for the benefit of all the Allies. With or without war some things are certain after the turning-point that was rounded on February 3. One is that our diplomatic heckling of the Allies must stop. Questions of blockade, of the censorship of mails, of the blacklist and of trade and property rights no longer interest us and cannot again be made the basis for representations by our State Department. It is notorious that the Allied blockade of Germany, close as it is, would have been far closer and far more effective but for the anxious consideration which the British and French Governments have shown for American good-will and American interests. We suggest that the State Department should now act as the British Government acted during the Civil War. Although at the beginning of the Civil War the naval forces of the North were manifestly and admittedly inadequate for the maintenance of the blockade, the British Government never once in any way questioned its validity. It constantly refused to support the claims of British traders whose ships

and cargoes were condemned by American Courts under the then novel doctrine of ultimate destination. On the contrary it time and again informed British traders that they must not look for diplomatic support, and even advised them not to carry on a commerce that was so likely to get them into trouble with the American authorities. A search some eighteen months ago through the records of the State Department failed to show a single protest on the part of Great Britain against the blockade of the Southern States. It did show, however, the acknowledgment of an instruction issued by the British Government to all British subjects to respect that blockade. We propose that the State Department should now, and whether we go to war with Germany or not, publicly intimate that so far as the United States is concerned the British Government may push its blockade as hard as it pleases, that all American citizens are henceforth expected to abide by it, and that no diplomatic assistance will be given to American traders who consider themselves injured by its enforcement.

Secondly—and this, again, is independent of whether hostilities actually ensue or not and follows naturally on the breach with Germany—the Government should do all that it can, within the limits of a benevolent neutrality, to facilitate the flotation of loans in this country for the Allied Governments. It should in other words withdraw the recent pronouncement of the Federal Reserve Board and issue in its place another statement from the same authority urging the American people to extend to Great Britain and France the credit facilities they desire. The financial as well as the moral power of the United States should from now onwards be definitely thrown on the side of the Allies. If Germany drives us to war, that will be done as a matter of course. But it ought to be done in any event, just as the submarines that were built for the British Government in the early days of the war and the delivery of which was forbidden by orders from Washington, should immediately be released and placed at the disposal of the British authorities. The question of finance, however, is urgent. Few acts of our Government have created a greater prejudice against us among the Allied peoples than the veto which the Federal Reserve Board virtually placed upon unsecured Allied loans. Few acts also have proved more injurious to American interests. It should now be made publicly and authoritatively known that the

veto is withdrawn and that no further hindrance will be offered to the placing of Allied loans, secured or unsecured, in the United States.

But war, if war comes, will raise other and far more momentous questions than these, questions not of expediency but of fundamental policy. It will raise in particular the question whether the United States is to become an Ally among the Allies or is to wage an independent war on her own account. Will she subscribe to the compact that the present Allies have subscribed to and agree not to make a separate peace, or will she insist on retaining her freedom to abandon hostilities the moment she thinks fit? It can hardly be imagined that we shall enter on any naval or military operations except in the closest consultation and co-operation with the Allies who for two and a half years have been shouldering the burden of the struggle. But how can that co-operation be effective, how can we or they measure the extent and form of our participation, unless the United States is bound by the same agreement as binds all the other Allies? Coming in as a free lance, pursuing undisclosed or indefinite aims, and liable at any moment to decide that we had had enough of it, the United States might be more of a hindrance than a help. Military policy and political policy at a time like this must march hand in hand. There is nothing that the French and British peoples would more heartily welcome than the appearance of a fully equipped American division on the soil of France. They would welcome it not so much for its material assistance but as a symbol of the brotherhood of democracy. But there might easily arise some awkward situations if the scope of its employment were not determined beforehand. It would have to fight, for instance, it could only fight, under the supreme direction of either the French or the British Commander-in-Chief; and he, naturally enough, in making his disposition, would like to have some assurance that the American forces placed at his disposal would be maintained at full strength and if necessary increased until the end of the war.

The position, in short, is one such as Washington contemplated when, in warning his country against permanent and entangling alliances, he emphatically advocated "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." The extraordinary emergency has arisen or must soon arise; and we hope there will be statesmanship enough at the capital to seize its

rich opportunities. We hope that Mr. Wilson, if and when Congress is compelled to declare war on Germany, will let it be known that, just as the United States can only take an effective part in the war by making its naval and military activities conform to the general scheme of Allied strategy, so the policy of the United States will be conducted hand in glove with the policy of the Allies. We hope that he will banish all half-heartedness, face the issues squarely and embrace the Allied cause without reservations and in the full light of the world. It would be unworthy both of our dignity and of his masculine intelligence if he paltered with this fundamental issue or allowed it to stand over in the hope that the course of events would solve it for him. There is much that the United States can do for the Allies in providing them with funds and munitions, in keeping the sea lanes open, and in hunting out the submarine bases that Germany has undoubtedly established on this side of the Atlantic. But in the necessities of the case, unless the war is prolonged beyond the present year, her main assistance must be moral. The best service she can render herself is to set about raising with the utmost possible expedition an Army of at least 1,000,000 men and grappling with the innumerable problems that such an enterprise would involve. The best service she can render the Allies is to range herself unreservedly on their side, to send outworn political prejudices to the scrap-heap, and to declare that she enters the war as an Ally among Allies, prosecuting it in conjunction with them and binding herself to make no peace except by the consent of them all.

OUR BREACH WITH GERMANY

It was a diplomatic, not a military, breach. That is the first point to be kept clearly in mind. To that we may unhesitatingly add that it was logical, just, and, so far as we were concerned, imperatively necessitous. For the more perfect establishment of these facts a brief review of its antecedents may be desirable.

It was based upon our note to Germany in the *Sussex* case. In that note, nearly a year ago, our Government told Germany in the most direct and unequivocal words that unless the submarine campaign as then conducted against merchant vessels was stopped, we should be compelled to sever all relations with that empire. The German Government replied with a promise that it would thereafter avoid

giving us offense in the way which we had complained of, but added that in return it would expect us to take certain action which it desired toward other Powers. Our perfectly proper and logical retort was that our dealings with other Powers were none of Germany's business, and that we could not concede the validity of any such condition. To this Germany made no reply whatever, but she tacitly conceded the justice of our position by abating the submarine campaign without waiting for us to act according to her dictation toward the other Powers. The United States, of course, never in the slightest degree withdrew or modified either the *Sussex* note or the rejection of Germany's impertinent condition of compliance with our demand.

Thus the case stood until a month ago. At that time Germany announced that she was about to resume the methods of submarine warfare against merchant vessels to which the United States had objected, in a still more extreme and offensive manner than before; and in fact she promptly proceeded so to do. There was thus no alternative but for the United States to fulfil the warning which it had given in the *Sussex* note; unless indeed it was to stultify itself and eliminate itself from the category of self-respecting and independent nations. The President accordingly severed all diplomatic relations with Germany. He did so promptly and inexorably, but in a particularly temperate manner, going out of his way to avoid unnecessary friction and to give Germany every possible opportunity to amend matters even at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour. But Germany made no amendment: She persisted in her offensive ways; and the severance of relations was made complete.

The severance of diplomatic relations is commonly described in international law as one of the "measures short of war" to which nations may have recourse for the redress of grievances. As such it has frequently been practised by our own and other nations without the result of war. We need not go back so far as the famous Swedish plot against George I of England, when each country caused the arrest and imprisonment of the other's minister. As recently as 1848 a British ambassador was expelled by the Spanish Government and for two years diplomatic relations between the two countries were entirely severed; but no war resulted. In our own history it will be recalled that diplomatic relations with France were repeatedly severed, in the time of

Washington and Adams and in that of Jackson; that they were once completely severed with Russia, and that on another occasion the Russian minister was expelled from this country; that they were once severed with Italy; and that on at least two occasions a British minister was expelled from the United States. But in not one of these cases did war occur, or was there serious danger or apprehension of it.

On the other hand, not one of our three foreign wars since the Revolution was preceded by a breaking off of diplomatic relations, such severance not occurring until the actual declaration of war.

It was, then, perfectly obvious when the President dismissed Count Bernstorff and recalled Mr. Gerard that he was not declaring war—which of course he could not have done, anyway—nor committing an act which would necessarily lead to war; and that if war did follow it would not be because of that act, unless in the quite unsupposable contingency that Germany elected to regard as a *casus belli* something which no respectable international jurist or diplomat so regards.

It was, however, clearly recognized, doubtless in Germany as well as here, that if this "measure short of war" did not prove sufficient for the abatement of our grievance and for the vindication of our rights, and that if Germany in spite of it persisted in her objectionable and offensive course, then we should have to seek recourse to other measures which might be less pacific and which might involve the actual waging of war. It was this latter consideration which invested the incident with its most portentous gravity.

Our example was not at once followed by the other aggrieved neutral nations. They had suffered much from the German submarine ravages, and would suffer more from the renewal of them; and they had protested vigorously against such renewal. But they did not sever relations, as we did. This was disappointing to our Government, and was regrettable, but it cannot justly be regarded as at all surprising. The President doubtless hoped that they would follow our example. Otherwise he would scarcely have solicited them to do so. Doubtless, too, their doing so would have added much moral force to our act, on which ground their abstention is to be regretted. But it would really have been cause for surprise had any one of them immediately taken that step; for at least three reasons.

One is, that not one of them had threatened it and committed itself to it, as we had done. We were under moral obligation to fulfil our word, but they had given no such word and were therefore under no such compulsion. Another is, that the danger of war was in their cases immeasurably greater than in ours, on account of the difference in distance from Germany and the difference between them and us in military strength, and they realized that war would probably mean for them for a time the fate of Belgium and Serbia. While the act in question would not necessarily have meant war, the possibility of war's occurrence was too ominous to be incurred to any degree, if it could be avoided.

The third reason for their failure to follow our example is not pleasant to contemplate, but it is a fact and it will be salutary if humiliating for us to recognize it. It was their uncertainty concerning the subsequent course of the United States. They had watched with amazement and with apprehension the hesitant and vacillating course of the President. They had seen his "watchful waiting," and the hideous fiascos of Vera Cruz and the Pershing expedition. They had heard his intimation that under the unspeakable provocation of the *Lusitania* infamy we might be "too proud to fight." They had heard him speak bravely of "strict accountability," and had seen all accountability neglected. In these circumstances it was only natural that they should hesitate to commit themselves to following his example, not knowing but that the next day he might himself repudiate and abandon it.

We were thus doomed to stand alone. But we stood alone on worthy and heroic ground, and that very isolation was not without some compensating advantages. There are those who rejoice because we were thus kept from even the slightest semblance of "entangling alliances." More to the point is it that we were impelled to a greater degree of self-reliance, and to a deeper realization of the necessity of holding our ground and of taking whatever subsequent steps might be found necessary. It was a vindication of our national manhood, belated but not yet too late. It entailed upon the President a colossal responsibility, but, as scarcely anything else could have done, it unified the nation in support of him and in readiness to bear with him responsibility for whatever else might come in a course thus justly and courageously undertaken. We have seen that in our history we have sev-

eral times hitherto severed relations with other Powers without making war upon them. But never before did we do it under so great provocation or with so weighty and convincing cause, and never was the potential sequel to our act comparable with that of the present time. Whatever may hereafter befall, we have done one straightforward, righteous act, entitling us, if we continue worthy of it, to confront the future self-reliant, confident and serene.

JAPAN IN ASIA AND AMERICA

RECENT events are assumed to have given a slightly changed aspect to our Japanese relations, though whether for better or for worse may be a disputed question. The States of Idaho and Washington have followed the example of California of some years ago. At the entreaty of the Federal Government they have refrained from enacting legislation offensively discriminating against the Japanese. That is a distinct gain for amicable foreign relations as well as for that domestic spirit of nationality which we still so greatly need to cultivate; though we must regret that the National Government has been compelled again humbly to sue for that respect for treaties and for international obligations which ought to be given by the States as a matter of course. Seeing how instantly and how completely the States all look to the nation to protect them from alien aggression, it surely should be incumbent upon the States to give the greatest possible deference to the nation in all external relationships.

The passage of the Immigration restriction bill over the President's veto is also assumed by some to affect our Japanese relations, and to do so unfavorably, though it is not clear that that estimate is well founded. The bill contains no direct reference to Japan, but at most enacts by implication the principle which has prevailed for years under an unwritten "gentlemen's agreement" between the two countries. It does not seem that this should be objectionable to Japan, that nation having, of course, no thought of repudiating or in any way evading that agreement. Indeed, it might logically be argued that the new law has no reference to that agreement. It merely provides that all aliens who have hitherto been excluded from this country shall continue to be excluded. But that must obviously mean those who have

been excluded by law or treaty, and cannot refer to the unwritten agreement, which is something which a formal statute cannot take into cognizance. We may hope, therefore, that the apprehensions which have been expressed concerning the Immigration law will prove to be groundless.

Both of these incidents, however, call renewed and emphasized attention to the complexity of our "Japanese problem" so far as the Japanese in America are concerned. That problem involves the power of the United States to enforce treaties upon the States as supreme law—an issue as old as our Government itself. It involves the equity of our naturalization system, with its discrimination against all who are not either Caucasians or Negroes. It involves the interpretation and application of the "most favored nation" clause in our treaties. Each of these issues is to some degree dependent upon the others, and each is partly domestic and partly international in its nature.

The inability of the general Government to compel States to respect the treaties which it made with other Powers was one of the gravest and most fatal weaknesses of the old Confederation. It was hoped that it was overcome under the Constitution, with its declaration that treaties should be a part of the supreme law of the land. Yet again and again we have got into trouble over the refusal of States to obey treaty stipulations, or over their refusal to vindicate treaty rights. So now we are confronted with the problem of requiring a State to receive immigrant aliens to whom it objects, and to give them equal treatment with its own citizens. The treaty says that this shall be done; the State says that it shall *not* be done, if it can prevent it either directly or indirectly.

Shall Japanese be permitted to own land in a State which objects to their doing so? Generally speaking, the right to own land is established by State law. The United States legislates on that subject for only the Federal District and the Territories, and in them it declares that aliens shall not own land. Among the States the practice varies. Some forbid aliens to own land. Some forbid only non-resident aliens. Some grant permission to own land to aliens belonging to countries where similar permission is given to Americans. Some throw open the doors wide to all comers. It seems to be conceded that the Federal Government cannot compel uniformity. If it did, moreover, it would, to be con-

sistent, have to require all States to adopt its own rule, and to prohibit alien ownership. Unfortunately, all foreign Powers do not appreciate our dual system. They do not deal with the individual States, but with the nation; and when they find their people treated in one way in one part of this country, and in another way in another part, they do not understand it. They want to know if the United States Government is not equally sovereign in all parts of the United States.

Another objection is made by Japan to what seems to her to be a violation of the treaty stipulation that she and her subjects shall have the same treatment as the most favored nation. Granted, what the United States maintains and which Japan does not dispute, that a State has the right to exclude aliens from land ownership, Japan holds that under the treaty all aliens must be equally excluded. It will not do, she contends, to let aliens from one country own land, and to deny the right to those from another country. The State replies, or the United States replies for it, that the discrimination is made on the basis of citizenship. Aliens eligible to citizenship may hold land; those not eligible may not. Japan does not concede the justice of that. But if she were to concede it, the question would be shifted to another point and not answered. She would then demand, as indeed she now does, to know how we can reconcile our refusal to admit Japanese to citizenship with the treaty stipulation that Japanese shall enjoy all the rights and privileges here of the people of the most favored nation.

These views of the problem, which do not by any means exhaust all its phases and intricacies, suggest at once its difficulties and its importance. It is essential that it shall be solved upon a satisfactory basis of equity. True, we may be, in time, strong enough to dictate arbitrarily our own solution of it. But it would not be wise so to do at the expense of incurring the ill-will and animosity of the most powerful nation in that part of the world in which we look for the greatest expansion of our trade. Japan is the guardian of the gates of China. We may be stronger than she; but it would not be pleasant or profitable for us to have to fight our way past her, and to go constantly armed in our intercourse with eastern Asia.

There is another part of the problem, the importance of which it would not be easy to over-estimate. That relates to

Japan's policies and operations in Asia, and their relation to the treaty rights of this country. Despite the sympathetic and friendly interpretation which was put upon it by Dr. William Elliot Griffis in a recent number of this REVIEW, there is a widespread feeling that Japan's course toward China is calculated to gain undue advantages over this country through practical abrogation of the "open door" policy. The demands which Japan some time ago made upon China, and which have, so far as can be ascertained, never been withdrawn, unquestionably comprised special privileges and advantages for Japan over all other countries, and impairment of China's independence in dealing with American and other Powers. They required China to surrender police control of much of her territory to Japan: they forbade her to do as she pleases with her own ports and islands; they compelled her to make purchases from Japan rather than from any other country, and to take Japanese advisers for her Government rather than those of any other nation. It requires no argument to demonstrate that the granting of these requirements by China would at least partly, and in truth largely, close the "open door," and would altogether destroy "equality of opportunity." It would therefore violate treaties now existing among the nations—between America and Japan, between America and China, and between Japan and China.

Our Government has protested against any impairment of its rights, but it does not appear that its protest has been effective, beyond the promotion of some polite note-writing. Japan seems to be persisting in her demands, and to be exerting more and more pressure upon China for the granting of them, while China, left to her own helplessness, seems to be steadily inclining toward a complete surrender. Obviously, if China is to be saved, if the door is to be kept open, if equality of opportunity is to be maintained, those things should be done now, in advance of yielding. It would be unspeakable folly to let the door be closed and then try to reopen it.

THE DECLINING BIRTH RATE.

Probably few people today have any recollection of Dr. Nathan Allen and his prophecy; even in Massachusetts. He made that prophecy just fifty years ago, and set all Massachusetts by the ears, from the Berkshires to Cape Cod.

Dr. Allen's prophecy had to do with what he called the degeneracy and diminution of the native stock of New England population. The native population, he asserted, was rapidly diminishing, as compared with the immigrant element, chiefly because of the decrease in its birth rate, and he predicted that with the continuance of that process the native population, in Massachusetts and throughout all New England, would dwindle to a small minority, completely overshadowed by aliens and the children of aliens.

The burden of his prophecy, and the feature of it which provoked the most criticism, denial and antagonism, was the evil of small families. Speaking of colonial days as contrasted with the present, he said: "Then large families were common—now the exception; then it was rare to find married people having only one, two or three children—now it is very common! Then it was regarded as a calamity for a married couple to have no children—now such calamities are found on every side of us; in fact, they are fashionable."

This was distasteful at that time; but it was undeniable. The records of early years, and the vital statistics of the State, bore witness to its truth. In one small Massachusetts town, which was settled in 1665, there were, seven or eight generations ago, 26 families with ten children each, twenty with eleven each, 24 with twelve each, 13 with thirteen each, one with fifteen, and one with twenty-one children. Thus in eighty-five families there were no fewer than 973 children.

In another town, of which the records had been scrupulously kept, the first generation after settlement averaged 9.50 children to a family, the second generation 7.31, the third 7.69, the fourth 7.64, the fifth 4.90, and the sixth only 2.84. Nor was this an exceptional town. In the entire number of towns the records of which were accessible and were examined the first generations had from eight to ten children in a family, the second, third and fourth generations had from seven to eight, the fifth about five, and the sixth less than three.

So low had the birth rate of the native population fallen, declared Dr. Allen, that it had actually become less than the death rate, so that the native element was actually dying out. On the other hand, not only were immigrants pouring into the State, but they were vastly more prolific than the natives; so that in the year 1860 the foreign population, though still

a decided minority, produced more children than the much larger native American population. In the counties in which there was a very small foreign element, there were many more deaths than births, while in those in which the alien element was large, there were many more births than deaths.

Dr. Allen was charged by his critics with making serious errors, partly in his statements and partly in the inferences and conclusions which he drew from them. It was also pointed out that some of his statements were based upon special and temporary conditions caused by the Civil War, and its drains upon the manhood of the State and its disturbance of domestic relations. Nevertheless his facts drawn from the history of the Colony and State were quite impregnable, and the real interest was centered upon the prospective fulfilment or non-fulfilment of his prediction concerning the continuance of the processes to which he had called attention, and their effect upon the population of the State.

To what extent that prophecy has been fulfilled, the last Federal census clearly suggests. Those processes have continued; until today, in Boston and in the State at large, the native white population, of native parentage, is a very small minority. These were the figures in 1910:

Native whites, of native parentage, in Boston, 157,870; in Massachusetts, 1,103,429. Percentages in the State, 33.1. Ratio of increase in the State in the preceding ten years, 6.9.

Native whites, of foreign or mixed parentage, in Boston, 257,104; in Massachusetts, 1,170,447. Percentage in the State, 35.2. Ratio of increase in ten years, 34.8.

Foreign born whites, in Boston, 240,722; in Massachusetts, 1,051,050. Percentage in the State, 31.6. Ratio of increase in ten years, 25.1.

Thus the native whites of foreign or mixed parentage considerably outnumber those of native parentage, and are increasing five times as fast; and the foreign born very nearly—by this time, probably, fully—equal the native stock, and are increasing more than three and a half times as fast. With the native stock forming less than one-third of the population, Dr. Allen's prophecy that it would become numerically overshadowed seems to be abundantly fulfilled.

The same conditions, practically, prevail throughout all New England, so far as the ratios of increase are concerned,

with the exception of Vermont, where the contrast between native and foreign growth is much less marked than elsewhere. In the first ten years of this century, the years for which we have already cited the Massachusetts figures, New Hampshire was by far the worst of all. There was in that State an actual decrease of 5.1 per cent. in the white population of native parentage, to an increase in the foreign of 28.5. Maine was next, with a native increase of 0.4 per cent. and a foreign of 27.1. In Vermont the native increase was only 1.8, but the foreign also was only 3.2. In Connecticut the native was 6.1 and the foreign was 32.7; and in Rhode Island the native was 10.2 and the foreign was 38.7. In the whole of New England the native increase was only 4.1 per cent. while the foreign was 30.

Now the consideration of widest importance is this, that it will not do to look upon these conditions and tendencies as confined to New England and the rest of this nation as exempt and permanently immune against them. In the Middle Atlantic States the same rule prevails, in a lesser degree; the native increase having been only 14.3 while the foreign increase was 27 per cent. Elsewhere, it is true, the native increase was still larger than the foreign, but by a steadily diminishing margin, but in the entire country the tendency is steadily toward smaller families. In fact, the average size of families in the United States as a whole is now actually smaller than in Boston and Massachusetts. In the United States the numbers of children in families, at decennial periods, averaged as follows: 1850, 5.6; 1860, 5.3; 1870, 5.1; 1880, 5.0; 1890, 4.9; 1900, 4.7; 1910, 4.5. These figures include both foreign and native elements, and it is doubtless for that reason that the numbers in Boston and Massachusetts, with their numerous immigrant families, are a trifle larger than in the whole nation, as follows: Boston, 1890, 5.0; 1900, 4.8; 1910, 4.8. Massachusetts: 1890, 4.7; 1900, 4.6; 1910, 4.6.

We must accept Dr. Allen's prophecy of fifty years ago, then, as substantially fulfilled for Boston, Massachusetts, and New England, and as in course of fulfilment for other States, while in one respect, that of the decline of fecundity and consequently of the birth rate, it is being fulfilled for the whole nation. We shall not forever be in a position to criticise France for her stationary population, or other European countries for their declining birth rates, but shall be com-

pelled to confess that we are undergoing the same processes, and that in some of the most essential respects self-vaunting Americans are after all "as common mortals."

For the birth rate is indisputably declining in almost every country in the world. That is to say, the fecundity of the human race is diminishing. That it will reach the vanishing point and the race thus become extinct is not, as we have said, supposable. In that nation in which of all the decrease has been by far the most marked there has been no such catastrophe. The birth rate has fallen to what appears to be an irreducible minimum, where it is just above the death rate, and there it remains fixed. The population remains about constant in numbers. But of physical or intellectual decay there is no symptom. Indeed that nation is at this very moment giving such a demonstration of unconquerable and even crescent vitality as the world has never seen before.

It does not seem fantastic, nor even extravagant, then, to contemplate the possibility of the whole world's approximating in this respect the condition of France. Whether that would be a disaster or a benefit would remain to be seen; with a tremendous responsibility for the answer resting upon practical sociologists and administrators. We do not need to recall Matthew Arnold's discourse upon "Numbers" to realize that quality is at least as essential as mere quantity, and it may be that some occult law of nature prescribes that the highest destiny of the race is to be worked out with a comparatively limited population, rather than with one teeming and overcrowding the earth.

A PASSIONATE PATRIOT

WHEN, some thirty years ago, Matthew Arnold returned to England at the close of his last visit to this country and was asked in ordinary course whom he had found here worth an Oxford man's while, he replied unhesitatingly, "Wayne MacVeagh is the most interesting American." He was, too; though how Matthew Arnold made the discovery or how his precise mind was able to withstand the shock passes far the limits of one's comprehension.

It was not so long ago. Mr. Cleveland must have been President; yes, he was; and Mr. Bayard was Secretary of State, Mr. Whitney of the Navy, Mr. Endicott of War, Mr.

Manning of the Treasury, Mr. Vilas—but enough; lest we take care, we shall be suggesting comparisons calling for a ferruling. What we had in mind was that Mr. MacVeagh, although ripe in knowledge, in experience and in honors, was then only about fifty-two years old and by no means at the zenith of his powers. Precisely when, in point of fact, if to his dying day, he did pass that unhappy meridian, nobody living can tell. Fluctuations of mood so constant as to be almost regular signified nothing—merely whiling themselves away like affrighted puffs of smoke before the tempestuous gales of an unquenchable spirit. So it was to the very end.

Henry Watterson probably has known personally a larger number of Presidents than anybody else, chiefly because he began to make acquaintances while serving as a page in the House of Representatives and was present when John Quincy Adams dropped dead upon the floor; but Mr. MacVeagh was not far behind. One time, during the McKinley Administration, he took the young wife of a new Western Senator in to dinner at the White House and enjoyed himself hugely as “Mr. McKay” while the latest enthusiastic discoverer of Washington descanted upon its glories. It was the lady’s first attendance at a State function. Had he ever dined in the White House before? Yes; oh, yes! But when? Ah, that would be telling; alas, it was so long ago. Nevertheless, he would answer the lady’s question if she in turn would reply to one from him. She would. Very well, then. He had first dined in the White House when Franklin Pierce was President. Now frankly and honestly did the lady know that Franklin Pierce once was President? The puzzled lady hesitated but was not lost. Indeed, she was game. No, frankly and honestly, she did not know that Franklin Pierce had been President and, defiantly after a pause, what was more she did not believe he ever was.

Such, however, was in fact the case and from that beginning, as the guest of Mr. Pierce, when he was twenty-two or twenty-three, this most interesting American sat at table more frequently than any other citizen with Buchanan, Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, Harrison, McKinley, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft—with every President in sixty years except, of course, Mr. Wilson and possibly, though we are not positive, Andrew Johnson. Indeed, he served nearly all of these magistrates in some official capacity. He was a Captain in the Army under Lincoln,

Minister to Turkey under Grant, Chairman of the Louisiana Commission under Hayes, Attorney-General under Garfield and under Arthur, Ambassador to Italy under Cleveland, and Chief Counsel of the United States at the Hague under Mr. Roosevelt. It was as a trusted personal adviser, however, that he rendered the most valuable service to each.

The most ardent of Union men, Mr. MacVeagh was a sincere friend of the South and did more probably than any other one person to break up carpet-bag government, thus fetching upon himself the objurgations of Benjamin F. Butler who taunted the "reformer" with having married the brilliant daughter of the mighty but unregenerate Simon Cameron. The response was eminently characteristic. Mr. MacVeagh lamented this symptom of failing powers as likely to "go far to destroy that reputation for effective scurrility" which Butler had "so sedulously fostered for years." His chief purpose in continuing the controversy was, he explained to Butler, "to exhibit you as a warning to younger men, by showing them that, in spite of great ability and energy, you had become the leper of our politics, by reason of the general conviction that you habitually disregard the eighth and ninth commandments." And he added that he should not take the trouble to notice any more of Butler's attacks, "for those who know me will not believe anything you say against me, and those who know you of course will not believe anything you say against anybody."

We surmise that, whether at his best then or not, Mr. MacVeagh "got more fun" out of life during the second Roosevelt Administration than at any other time. The zest and vigor of the President in his dealings with "the interests" represented by the strong men in Congress was as exhilarating to his eager spirit on the one hand as the peculiar charm of the First Lady of the Land was captivating to his critical appreciation of social aptitude. One Winter in particular was made notable by a series of luncheon parties, which, as occasions for sprightly conversation, have hardly been excelled. Invariably the day was Saturday, when the work of the week had ended, and the party—well, the party was not always the same, but usually Secretary Root was there and Secretary Taft and Speaker Cannon and Senator Proctor (the drollest and driest of all) and Mr. Francis Sargeant and occasionally Senators Aldrich and Beveridge, Mr. Watterson, Major Hemphill or others who happened to be in

town and *always* Mark Twain and Mr. MacVeagh. The unvarying question, so Mr. Root was accustomed to remark, was, which will get started first today—Clemens or MacVeagh? And so, indeed, it was. Either was good for a monologue of two hours at least and neither would brook an instant's interruption even if anybody had been disposed, as nobody ever was, to check the flow of humor from the one or of wit from the other. As a preliminary of the encounter, it became a habit of the two to meet "at 1719" (Massachusetts Avenue) in the morning "to limber up," when to each other they were "Uncle Wayne" and "Uncle Mark" and spoke freely their opinions of the human race in general and of constituted authorities, political, literary and religious, in particular. And these talks, too, were far from spiritless.

But the truth is that, to put forth the full issue of their inspiration, both Mr. Clemens and Mr. MacVeagh required an audience—not merely a certain number of listeners but a congeries of minds upon a plane with their own, such as have been indicated. We have never known two men further removed from Charles Lamb in "loving a fool." And that is rather surprising, too, especially of a master of irony like Mr. MacVeagh if not of a humorist like Mark Twain. Even Matthew Arnold himself loved a fool "in a mortar," where he could pestle him to death. But not so with these, to whom time was precious and patience little known.

"I tell you, sir" (this would be in the morning) "that man is a fool." "No," would be the drawling response, "you are mistaken. Don't exaggerate. Be exact. He is a lunkhead." "Right, right; amendment accepted"—and so on to something else.

If one would have a true picture of Mr. MacVeagh, he has only to turn to any authoritative sketch of Voltaire. The two were alike as brothers, not only in thought and expression, but in every essential purpose of their beings. Both were perhaps most noticeably voices of protest, but back of every declaration of dissent, constantly stirring, agitating, inspiring, was revolt against any form of tyranny or autocracy, crystallized into two of the noblest individual fights for human freedom the world has ever known. The regal setting of his period gave more conspicuousness to the great François, but in persistent endeavor and tireless energy Mr. MacVeagh was quite his equal. From the time when he retired from active practice of the law hardly a day,

passed on which he did not strike a blow somewhere, somehow, for personal liberty. It might be in the form of an anonymous communication to a newspaper, or of a signed article, or of a letter to a public official, or of bestirring, even belaboring, others into fresh activities, but whatever the means the sun seldom set upon nothing done to break injustice and to strike down unequal privileges.

If the old man Calas had lived in Chester, Pennsylvania, instead of in Toulouse, and had been executed for killing his son, we know very well what would have happened. Wayne MacVeagh would have done precisely what Voltaire did,—given of his time, his money, his skill and all of his powers of denunciation and savage wit till the wrong was righted and the memory exonerated.

We should, indeed, rather have expected him to address the judges of either Toulouse or Chester much as he did speak to the bench and bar upon his return from Italy to this effect, "When I look around me and see the many lawyers here who never can be judges and the many judges who never have been lawyers I realize that I am back again in Pennsylvania." But, of course, he could do and say things that from any other would have been unpardonable. Who else would have had the humorous audacity to pause in an argument before the Supreme Court and say calmly "May it please your Honors, I move that the court do now adjourn; I wish to take the four o'clock train for home"; gathering his papers simultaneously with the entering of the order, seemingly as a matter of course, by the Chief Justice?

Fascinatingly loquacious as he commonly was, Mr. MacVeagh held certain subjects in reserve as sacred to himself. Never once did we hear him utter a word indicating his religious belief. It is a natural supposition, however, that he would have subscribed generally to the faith finally and masterfully declared by Voltaire, contrary to expectation and even somewhat to present-day understanding, in the existence of a God, a Father of all men. There was this odd difference: While both invariably spoke of the Christ with veneration and tenderness, Voltaire frequently used the name Jesus but Mr. MacVeagh (to the best of our knowledge) always referred with touching reverence to "the Saviour." But the main point of resemblance to our mind is this: If Benjamin Franklin had taken his grandson for

a blessing to Mr. MacVeagh a few weeks before he died at eighty-three as, in fact, he did take him to Voltaire a few weeks before he died at eighty-three, the words spoken to accompany the laying on of hands would have been the same—"God and Liberty!"

Just as surely as Voltaire, a full century before Henry James, Junior, appropriated the term, was the original Passionate Pilgrim, so Mr. MacVeagh was our Passionate Patriot. His was no ordinary love of native land; it was furious devotion, often stormy, not unfrequently in specific instances so excessive as to seem almost irrational. And in his later years, notably since the beginning of the mighty conflict between freedom and tyranny, the world became his country. Whether if pressed at the close he would have put France in the place of honor before America we cannot and would not know, but could there be a finer tribute than this from the last article that bore his name:

"And I must pause here to salute with reverence our Sister Republic of France. In all history I know nothing more sublime than the devotion to Liberty with which her sons have defended their country and the world against the overwhelming hosts of Attila and his Huns. 'Frightfulness' has not discouraged them; savagery, using poison as a new weapon in war, has not frightened them. They have stood in their splendid courage against all odds—God grant they may so stand to the end!—for they are fighting for our Republic as well as for their own."

The excerpt, perhaps we should remark, is from the extraordinary essay, "The Impassable Chasm," published in this *Review* for July, 1915, beginning and ending with these simple words:

It is with the greatest reluctance that I find myself obliged, at my present age and with the health which naturally is its accompaniment, compelled by a sense of public duty, to take part once more in any controversy, and especially in one which has aroused so much bitterness of feeling and has led so many persons to transgress in my judgment the proper limits of loyal American citizenship. I had persuaded myself some time ago that I was released from offering further advice to others and justified in devoting the days remaining to me to securing, as far as possible, a conscience void of deliberate offense both to my fellow-men and to God for the change now so near me and which I await with cheerfulness and hope. When, however, I passed in review the innumerable kindnesses, so far be-

yond my deserts, which I had received during my long life from my fellow-citizens, I here felt constrained to make some further small return, however inadequate, by endeavoring to point out what seemed to me the plain line of duty of all living under the Stars and Stripes in the present appalling conditions which the Kaiser and the German rage for conquest have precipitated upon the world.

* * * * *

No matter where a man is born or how he is reared, when he comes to manhood he instinctively prefers to be a *citizen* or a *subject*. Our fathers preferred, and we ourselves and our children all prefer, to be free citizens, but we do not for that reason deny to anybody else the privilege of preferring to be the obedient subject of a Kaiser and a Military Caste. We only ask them in all fairness to themselves and to us to make their choice,—to be loyal either to the fundamental principles of our Government or those of the government of the Kaiser, and to believe that they cannot be half loyal to the one and half loyal to the other. They must be wholly American, or wholly German, and if they really prefer the German system of government, they should return thither and enjoy it; but if they propose to continue to live here, then they must be loyal to the American system, and there is no possibility for them of mistaking what that system is. Thomas Jefferson declared it to the whole world when he said the just rights of all governments depend upon the consent of the governed, and Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, in a few simple words, stamped it forever upon the history of mankind, in his immortal aspiration that government of the people, by the people and for the people should never perish from the earth. Whoever accepts without reservation those two principles of government is a loyal American. Whoever pretends to accept them and is at heart disloyal to them is unworthy of American citizenship and ought to be deprived of it, for it is an impassable chasm which those honestly on one side can never pass over to the other.

I can only repeat that it is with the greatest regret I have felt impelled to utter these words; but from the beginning of my long life until its close I have been treated with so much undeserved kindness by my countrymen of all races that I could no longer feel happy not to make this friendly appeal to those of German birth or descent who seem to me to have wandered from the true standards of American citizenship and clouded their conception of it with at least a quasi-allegiance to a military monarchy. And it will add to the peace of the closing days of a long and happy life to know that this last duty as God has given me to see it has been discharged, however imperfectly, and that I close what I felt obliged to say without a trace of ill-feeling towards a single one of my fellow-men—but with the conviction of all my life unimpaired that “government by the people” is the best form of government yet vouchsafed to the children of men.

Mr. MacVeagh designed these to be his last words to his fellow countrymen, and such technically they were, although subsequently—in June, 1916—he indited under the pseudonym “Historicus” a heartrending lament upon the anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

The assassin Guiteau declared bitterly that the veins of Wayne MacVeagh held only ice water, and we have no doubt that the assassin Guiteau had most excellent reason for thinking so, since none could be more ruthless or more relentless than he in pursuit and punishment of criminals. It must, moreover, be confessed that, as so often happens, the satirist would occasionally pass the limit of reasonableness and the hater of injustice would be himself unjust. Indeed, one first beholding Mr. MacVeagh in the glory of intellectual conflict could not easily have been prepared for the revelation at close range of a nature so true, so considerate, so affectionate and so full of fun. But if any but a great heart could have produced his anonymous “Appeal to Millionaires” and his bold demand upon his friend President Taft to “Consider the Poor,” then there can be no logical relationship between source and issue. A sturdy, fighting soul, yes; but withal the most compassionate of men. He had beautiful hands.

Mr. MacVeagh was more than a frequent contributor to this REVIEW; he became a sentient, vital part of it,—as its guide, impetuous; as its philosopher, inimitable; as its friend, invaluable. Well might Matthew Arnold, had he been speaking for us, have said of his most interesting American what he did say of another:

Who prop, thou ask'st, in these bad days, my mind?—

He much, the old man, who, clearest-souled of men,

Saw the Wide Prospect, and the Asian Fen.

. . . Be his

My special thanks, whose even-balanced soul,

From first youth tested up to extreme old age,

Business could not make dull, nor passion wild;

Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole.